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Abstract 
In their efforts to break with aircraft assistance, Thales Avionics and the ENSC (Ecole 
Nationale Supérieure de Cognitique) – through the work carried out within their Human 
Factors for Aerospace Laboratory (HEAL) – have been investigating HMIs assisting 
pilots in the anticipation process. The approach is user-centred: the understanding of the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying the anticipation process allows a context-dependent 
anticipation model to be devised, which aims at designing an ecological assistance tool 
for pilots. A possible approach to the anticipation process consists of investigating how 
cognitive plans are developed. To start with, the concepts of anticipation and planning 
are reviewed. By comparing their definitions, both concepts can be clearly differentiated 
and the essential function of a plan can be emphasised. The question of the plan as a 
means of saving cognitive resources is then addressed. Examples in aeronautics are 
given. Several relevant surrounding psychological concepts are introduced, pointing out 
the main features of the plan: hierarchy and deficiency. To conclude, based on the 
conditions of implementation of the plan, the mechanisms of anticipation are discussed, 
which are close to the principle of reafference. 
 
Keywords: anticipation, planning, cognitive resource management, plan, literature 
review, aeronautical psychology 
 
The plan as a cognitive-resource-saving tool  3 
The plan as a cognitive-resource-saving tool: planning and anticipation, examples 
in aeronautics 
In an effort to break with aircraft assistance, a study is conducted on HMIs 
assisting pilots in the anticipation process. The approach is user-centred: the 
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the anticipation process allows a 
context-dependent anticipation model to be devised, which aims at assisting pilots 
through an ecological HMI. A possible approach to the anticipation process consists of 
investigating how cognitive plans are developed. 
From definitions of the concepts of anticipation and planning, this literature 
review will address the question of the plan as a means of saving cognitive resources, 
from its preparation to its implementation. This review will rely on works in the field of 
cognitive psychology, mainly those by Amalberti and Hoc, and will insist on their 
contribution to the field of aeronautical psychology. It will be illustrated with examples 
taken from both civil and military aviation, in order to point out various kinds of 
constraints, in particular time constraints. 
In this effort, the anticipation process will be specifically contemplated and 
scrutinised. From the activation to validation of a plan, the literature referenced will 
highlight a closed-loop mechanism, close to the principle of reafference of von Holst & 
Mittelstaedt (1950). 
Definitions: planning or anticipation? 
Even though the term ‘anticipate’ is widely used, it is nonetheless difficult to 
define it precisely. Its Latin etymology ‘anticipare’ means ‘to take action beforehand, to 
take the initiative, to take the lead’. It is often confused with the terms ‘predict’, 
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‘foresee’ and ‘plan ahead’. One idea is common to these concepts: the process is both in 
the present and in the future.  
In psychology, Sutter (1983) defined anticipation as a ‘movement by which man 
carries his entire being beyond the present into a future, near or far, that is essentially 
his future’ (p. 5). Even though this definition does not exclusively consider taking 
action, it elicits the idea of thinking ahead: to anticipate is to represent ourselves and our 
environment in a process of evolution and adaptation.  
In cognitive psychology, Cellier (1996) gave the following definition:  
‘An activity consisting of evaluating the future state of a dynamic 
process, determining the type and timing of actions to undertake on the basis of a 
representation of the process in the future, and, finally, mentally evaluating the 
possibilities of these actions. It is dependent on the general purpose assigned to 
an operator in a dynamic context, which is to keep the process, physical or 
otherwise, within acceptable limits, and therefore avoid the propagation of 
disturbances. It is also governed by a logic aimed at reducing the complexity of a 
given situation. Finally, it is a way of managing individual resources.’ (p. 35)  
Several ideas are included in this definition: assessment of the development of the 
situation, mental simulation, and anchoring in both temporality and action. Two 
important aspects should be stressed: the teleonomic aspect, as anticipation only makes 
sense in light of a general purpose; and the cognitive aspect, as the process is also 
governed by the need to reduce the load and complexity of the environment. It is 
therefore possible to anticipate without planning. 
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By contrast, planning cannot be detached from anticipation. Hoc (1987) defined 
planning as ‘the development and/or implementation of plans’ (p. 68). In other words, 
planning consists of building a simplified schematic representation of a task, breaking it 
down into sub-goals, the aim of this being both to save cognitive resources and to be 
action-oriented: planning is teleonomic, i.e. it is directly linked to the achievement of a 
predefined end. As a result, according to Amalberti (1995), if the purpose of planning is 
to develop an executable plan which is compatible with the operator’s skills, the 
purpose of anticipating is precisely to test the validity of such a plan. After pointing out 
the central position of the concept of plan, this study will focus on the means of 
preparing and implementing plans. 
About the concept of plan 
Developing plans  
Hoc (1987) defined the concept of plan as ‘a schematic and/or hierarchical 
representation which is likely to guide the activity’. The terms ‘schematic’ and 
‘hierarchical’ are of particular importance: they mean that the representation is defined 
at a low level of detail and that a strategy of successive refinements is needed. If, in 
Rasmussen’s decomposition hierarchy (Rasmussen, 1986), the plan is defined at a 
higher level of detail than the implementation of the activity, then it can be hierarchical 
as well: this will bring to light different levels in the plan’s structure, and the 
relationship existing between such levels. This may prove useful when the 
implementing rules of a given procedure are linked to those of a sub-procedure to be 
performed later. Thus, planning also consists of sequencing operations before 
performing them. 
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Amalberti (2001) highlighted a fundamental limitation in dynamic contexts: the 
processes of planning and refining a representation are to last until no credible solutions 
are found or as long as the cost of implementing the representation is unacceptably high. 
O’Hara & Payne (1998, 1999) brought up the ‘stopping condition’: the most important 
point consists of defining a meta-plan relying on adequacy criteria (minimum 
acceptable requirements, objectives, costs) and defining the difficulties that need to be 
avoided or addressed. It is not necessary to refine the current representation indefinitely 
with unsteady elements or if the defined solution is strong enough with regard to the 
acceptable requirements. 
In the context of photographic reconnaissance in single-seater fighter aircraft, 
Amalberti (1996) distinguished between expert and novice approaches: expert pilots use 
prospective procedural planning, whereas novices use a mix of prospective strategies – 
the ones they are taught – and retrospective strategies in order to manage realistic 
implementations considering their lack of expertise. As a result, experts are faster at 
developing plans for they possess metaknowledge which allows them to use already 
memorised parts of plans. This study will then focus on the structure and main features 
of the plan. 
The plan and related concepts 
The first main feature of the plan has been outlined above: it is fundamentally 
schematic. Its second main feature is that of being oriented towards anticipation. Several 
cognitive psychology concepts related to the plan deal with the latter feature. The notion 
of ‘scheme’ introduced by Piaget (1952) goes further in this direction: any actions taken 
in the real world would follow a predetermined scheme adapted to the current situation. 
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A direct consequence of this postulate is that the notion of expectation about the 
development of the situation must be added to our view of the plan. Vergnaud (1985) 
insisted on the relationship between the scheme and the real world: he put the stress on 
the necessary isomorphism between the plan and the real world, which is validated by 
the performance of the plan. Denecker (1999) postulated that the scheme organises the 
subject’s behaviour by cutting the real world down into objects. The resulting 
representation may be the subject of operations, inferences, rules of action, or even 
predictions and expectations. 
Regarding Bartlett’s concept of ‘schema’ (Bartlett, 1932), Denecker (1999) 
raised several issues relevant to the debate:  
 it is an unconscious mental structure produced from past experience;  
 it stores, in the long-term memory, a set of active knowledge structures 
instead of passive images;  
 it is a reconstruction, not a copy, of the past.  
Bobrow & Norman (1975) hypothesised that the schema is not a definite structure, and 
that it links the variables and the constraints over them. Such variables are singled out 
during the performance of the plan thanks to environmental clues which shape the 
implementation of the plan.  
In short, as pointed out earlier, the plan is hierarchical and it is also 
fundamentally deficient. Thanks to its structure, operations can be performed on the 
plan itself, and this feature is a way of saving resources. Next, the accuracy of this 
representation needs to be reviewed. 
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Plans, time constraints and implementation 
Amalberti (1996) pointed out the role of time constraints in the search for a 
compromise between the cost of plan development and the degree of accuracy in 
guidance, i.e. the tolerance to variations linked to possible hazards. In less dynamic 
systems, the action plan is usually maintained at a low level of detail and its 
interpretation and the ultimate choices of implementation are made at the very moment 
of performance of the plan (de Keyser & van Daele, 1986); besides, the preparation of 
solutions is not given much attention. In more dynamic (i.e. fast) processes, such as 
fighter aircraft, the pilot needs to arm himself against the lack of time and resources in 
order to develop new plans or solve unforeseen problems. The solution lies in 
developing more detailed and mode guiding plans, and preparing responses to a limited 
number of likely incidents. It is a bet, weighted by the pilot’s experience and the context 
of action. 
A commercial-transport-aircraft flight is a temporally intermediate situation. 
Preparing to incidents is no longer part of the initial briefing but is contemplated on a 
sequence-by-sequence basis during the entire flight. Wickens (2002) defined four kinds 
of tasks to be undertaken while flying an aircraft: aviating, navigating, communication, 
and systems management. All of these tasks need to be performed, and this is the reason 
why pilots, however expert they may be, rely on checklists. Anticipating can therefore 
consist of preparing responses to a list of likely events. This example is in line with 
Rasmussen’s SRK model (Rasmussen, 1983): when facing a complex situation 
requiring implementation of knowledge to construct a response, anticipation makes it 
possible to develop a routine that is ready to use when appropriate. Amalberti (1996) 
developed the idea further: the operator avoids, as much as possible, situations which 
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prove complex with regard to his own expertise, and he gets ready for unavoidable 
situations by organising his responses beforehand. 
Nevertheless, a few important limitations should be noted: checklists can by no 
means assist the pilot in performing multiple tasks simultaneously, nor do they address 
– by definition – the unexpected. Moreover, it is often not possible to draw up a list of 
tasks related to procedural knowledge, however vital this knowledge may be for the 
appropriate performance of the tasks (Wickens, 2002). 
As discussed earlier, anticipation is the most important tool for implementing 
plans, the details and objectives of which depend on expertise. Deviations from plans 
are a perfect example of this (Amalberti, 1996). For expert pilots, deviations are 
systematic and repetitive but limited in their value. Though accurate, the framework 
provided by plans allows sufficient latitude for interpretation during implementation. 
Experts therefore prefer procedural, action-oriented plans in order to save cognitive 
resources. For novice pilots, deviations are exceptional but of greater magnitude: they 
are not the result of procedural interpretation but of a will to protect the initial plan and 
apply the responses prepared during planning. An example is the case of young pilots 
who delay their actions intentionally in order to anticipate a subsequent situation to 
which they may have to react by increasing their speed.  
Whereas planning consists of developing plans, anticipation works toward their 
validation. After analysing the structure of plans, the mechanisms of anticipation will 
now be reviewed.  
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Anticipation 
In the context of driving a car, Tanida & Pöppel (2006) and Mundutéguy & 
Darses (2007) offered a generalisation of the principle of reafference proposed by von 
Holst & Mittelstaedt (1950) to explain how anticipation works: a plan of the situation is 
activated from a pattern of sensory environmental clues. The expectation component of 
the plan was described above. An efferent copy of this component is produced, which 
can be compared with the real world. The plan is, in itself, an active means of 
recognition: it guides and directs the search for information in order to validate itself 
(Amalberti, 1996). A plan is validated when its entire content can be particularised to 
the situation; but some mechanisms make it possible to fill any gaps with acceptable 
default values.  
The teleonomic component of the plan was described above: it is action-oriented 
and directed towards a specific purpose. This component of the plan is subject to two 
forms of monitoring (Amalberti, 1996): external monitoring – involving the physical 
process and the situation –, and internal monitoring – involving the cognitive actor of 
the process. In case of problem (negative outcome in self-assessment of the 
performance), thanks to internal monitoring, the degree of cognitive investment can be 
increased in order to adjust the selected mental model: enrichment, adjustment, or even 
construction of a new solution. This metacognitive monitoring is also in charge of 
arbitrating the following processes: intensity, priority, stopping.  
Depending on the available timeframe, this monitoring offers different 
strategies: in the short term, the operator first and foremost tends to deal with ongoing 
tasks, using heuristics and various measurements (predictability, time constraints, etc.) 
to be able to perform multiple tasks at the same time while minimising risks; in the long 
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term, the Cognitive Architecture of Dynamic Control model described by Hoc & 
Amalberti (1994) illustrates the possibility, for the operator, to open several cognitive 
loops simultaneously, which project into different levels of temporal depth.  
The levels of performance, models and anticipations are continually self-
assessed. Because of his cognitive limitations, the operator has to achieve a compromise 
with regard to the possible corrections; this compromise is based on the resources 
available and on the various requirements related to the task. Three loops take place in 
three different temporalities – i.e. three distinct ambitions of corrections – from 
automatic control to the complete reconsideration of the current representation. As set 
out earlier, the attentional supervisor is responsible for the possible corrections and for 
any local changes in the level of action control. 
At this stage, it appears that a major way of assisting pilots in the anticipation 
process consists of helping them choosing their plans. This may be considered as a 
further argument in favour of our approach: the operator remains at the centre of the 
decision loop. Any additional information that may be provided to the operator would 
help him construct or complete his representation but would not, under any 
circumstances, intend to replace it. 
Conclusion 
As shown throughout this study, the plan plays a central role in both the 
cognitive-resource-saving process and the anticipation process. In order to design a tool 
assisting operators in the anticipation process, it is relevant to tackle process modelling 
starting from the plan itself. This literature review pointed out the hierarchical and 
fundamentally deficient structure of the plan, as well as its activation through the 
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detection of a pattern of environmental clues. Defining an activation framework can be 
a way of designing such a tool. 
A last important aspect is about the distance between the initial plan and the plan 
actually implemented. Two subsidiary questions emerge:  
 How to measure the cognitive cost of challenging an established plan, or even 
wholly or partially rebuilding it, when faced to contradictory environmental 
elements (unfulfilled expectations)? 
 How to handle tolerance to deviations from the initial plan (are errors controlled 
or not)? 
These questions will be the subject of more detailed investigations in future works. 
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